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In Hungary employee ownership has been the most frequent form of employee par-
ticipation. The ‘Munkavállalói Résztulajdonosi Program’ (Employee Share Ownership Pro-
gramme, MRP – by its Hungarian abbreviation, ESOP hereafter), one form of em-
ployee ownership based on the US ESOP model spread quickly in the early phase of 
privatization as a technique in favour of employees to become owners. None the less, 
the relative weight of this ownership form in the whole of the economy is insignificant, 
and with privatization over, the number of ESOP companies has been fast decreasing. 
With the exception of the ‘Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program’ introduced 
by the tax laws in 2003, other forms of employees’ financial participation have taken 
place only to a very limited extent, without any economic policy support – and conse-
quently any proper central registration systems.  
 
a) History 
In the researchers’ view, ‘the current characteristics of employee participation are con-
nected to the 1968 reforms of economic mechanisms and the resulting power relations 
as well as to the privatization process and regulatory interests’.1 
 
(1) Changes in Corporate Governance in the Late-Period State Socialism 
Starting with the reforms in 1968 (‘New Economic Mechanism’) which introduced a 
set of new elements of incentives and becoming full-fledged in 1984 with the legaliza-
tion of self-government, ‘market co-ordination’ (Kornai) replaced the redistributive 
and bureaucratic socialist economic system as the main economic co-ordination 
mechanism. Importantly for the topic of this paper, as a result of these reforms the 
autonomy of state enterprises and the economic power of managers had drastically 
grown by the time of the political and legal change of the regime and thus could be-
come key actors in the economic transition.  
The history of employee ownership 
a.) At the beginning of the reform, as an improvement of company’s incentive system, 
profit-sharing was introduced, which became a part of the centrally set wages in state-
owned companies. The underlying idea was that this form of performance incentive 
would encourage employees, primarily managers, improve the efficiency of the com-
pany. By the time of the change of the regime, however, the use and size of profit-
                                                 
1  From the economic history point of view it is interesting to remember that employee ownership in 
Hungary began with the Workers’ Councils of the 1956 revolution. The idea then was that the 
state would retain ownership but Workers’ Councils would manage the companies and be compe-
tent in making strategic decisions including hiring and firing CEOs, selected by competition 




sharing was a matter of bargain between the enterprises and economic regulatory or-
ganisations and was used to minimize company taxes and had nothing to do with ac-
tual economic performance. 
b.) One of the antecedents of employee ownership in Hungary was the Enterprise 
Business Partnership (VGMK), possible as of 1982. VGMKs were ‘intrapreneurial’ 
businesses of core workers in which on the one hand the work organisation was im-
proved through greater autonomy of workers and on the other hand workers could 
earn extra incomes which helped the companies to retain key employees in the context 
of labour market competition. (Neumann, 1987) 
c.) As an important step of the new economic mechanism, in 1984 the self-government 
of companies was institutionalised; state enterprises were managed by Enterprise 
Councils or Assemblies elected by the workers. Transferring part of the ownership 
rights (from selecting the CEO to making investment decisions) to the these bodies 
further increased company autonomy – though the actual measure of autonomy de-
pended on the industry, size of the company and other specifications – vis-à-vis the 
Communist party-state regulation, and put the management in quasi owner position 
without real control by owners. 
  
(2) Co-operatives 
Between the two world wars there was a considerable co-operative movement in Hun-
gary. Credit co-operatives, which financed craftsmen, and agricultural trading and crop 
manufacturing co-operatives were especially important. The best known of the latter 
was the ‘Ant Co-operative’ (Hangya), which was set up on the Western model but was 
heavily centralised in Hungary. Its social base comprised medium-sized landowner 
farmers, who were also one pillar of the conservative political system of the time. After 
the communist takeover in 1948, credit co-operatives were liquidated and the rest of 
national co-operative centres were put under the control of the Communist party and 
the state and their finances were centralised. In the 1950s and 60s the party state mo-
nopolised the ideology and the institutions of the co-operative movement, whereby 
they could nationalise individual micro enterprises. First the majority of craftsmen, 
then retail shop keepers were forced to join the communist co-operatives; later farmers 
with small- and medium-sized lands were forced to join, and by 1960 and 61 practically 
all of these holdings, created earlier by the distribution of land in 1945, were liquidated.  
The artificially inflated co-operative sector employed about one quarter of total em-
ployment in the state socialist period. 1st January 1986 14.8% of the nearly 5 million 
employed were co-operative members (or a ‘helping family members’) and 8.7% 
worked as co-operative employees. 69% of co-operative members worked in agricul-
ture, 22% in manufacturing and 5% in construction. With the approaching change of 
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the regime, the rate of co-operative members somewhat dropped, to 12.1% of the total 
employment in 1989.2 
In the command economy, co-operatives, just as the state sector, were put under cen-
tral control and were integrated in the system of institutions of the all embracing cen-
tral distribution. By 1980, as a result of concentration, giant organisations were created: 
the management of these hierarchically organised undertakings required considerable 
professional and managerial skills. For instance, a co-operative with 800 members had 
30 to 40 heads with real power. When owing to reforms the autonomy of these enter-
prises grew, co-operative leaders, formally elected but in reality exercising uncontrolled 
power, recognised that the assets they were put in charge to manage could be owned 
by themselves. National co-operative centres, having become the lobby organisation of 
co-operative heads, had successfully fought for legislation and in the late 1980s the 
necessary amendments were made that enabled them to use a variety of techniques to 
formally deprive the majority of co-operative members of their ownerships rights. Af-
ter dividing up the common asset into small ownership, most of the co-operatives were 
transformed into business enterprises (limited liability companies or joint-stock com-
panies). In this way the business assets of co-operatives could be privatized and most 
often finally became owned by co-operative heads. The situation in agriculture was 
somewhat more complex because land was restituted to original owners or their de-
scendants. So the currently successor organisations of co-operatives most often lease 
agricultural land from the new owners.  
 
(3) The Privatization Environment 
The legal frames of the various forms of employee participation, especially of ESOP, 
continue to be shaped by the laws created at the time of privatization.3 Furthermore, 
the interconnections of the political and social background of privatization analysed in 
this paper may help understand the behaviour of participants as well as legislation and 
current policies.  
The most important objectives of the centralised privatization policy in Hungary, as 
opposed to the earlier, legally largely unregulated ‘spontaneous privatization’, were 
rapid de-nationalisation, maximizing the (cash) revenue and repaying the state debt, 
ameliorate the capital situation of the economy and create competitive structures. 
While the subsequent governments and their economic policy makers in charge of pri-
vatization broadly agreed on these objectives, their emphases were different. Em-
ployee-ownership was mostly a societal, justice and equity policy priority thus it could 
                                                 
2  Statistical Yearbooks, 1987, 1990, Hungarian Central Statistical Office (hereafter: HCSO). 
3  The creation of employee ownership is the result of the special circumstances of transition rather 
than of the rational operation of organisations in the market economy (Janky, 2002). Their sur-
vival, however, is related to usual market economy factors. 63% of companies in management 
ownership had operated in another form before, i.e. they became employee-owned through priva-




only become a realistic option when privatization demand shrank and/or the popular-
ity of privatization seemed intolerably low. With the appearance of mass unemploy-
ment in 1991, employee ownership increasingly seemed to be a tool for the company 
to continue operation and for keeping human resources and jobs. (At the time of mass 
privatization, especially in the beginning, however, the effects of various cases of trans-
actions were not studied due to lack of routine and shortage of time.) Generally, in the 
centralised privatization program employee ownership was an option in enterprises 
that no foreign buyer wanted to buy. These enterprises were successfully privatized 
with the active help of the management in the frames of some kind of decentralized 
technique ( in the so-called small privatization or self-privatization programmes). 
Employees stood a greater chance to become owners in decentralised programs in 
which individual evaluation of the enterprise as well as the interdependence of com-
pany management and privatization advisors ensured a greater room for trade-offs. 
The newly gained power, due to the law on Business Associations put the company 
management in an extremely advantageous position both in reshaping the relations be-
tween the establishment and the headquarters and in the privatization process. 
Throughout the whole privatization period as a rule, given the company’s inside power 
relations, no enterprise could be sold against the will of the local management..  
In the period of the ‘spontaneous privatization’, part of the company management be-
came owners. The intransparency of the ‘spontaneous privatization’ before the setting 
up of the State Property Agency as well as procedures dubious from the point of view 
of public asset management and fairness towards employees are the causes of anti-
managerial public attitudes and of the political and social illegitimacy of acquisition of 
company assets by some of the managers (Móra, 1991; Csillag, 1991). It was one of the 
major reasons why hidden Manager Buy-Out became quite widespread in Hungary.    
Another part of enterprise managers lead the movement for ownership by the em-
ployee’s collective. Privatization of establishments by limited liability companies set up 
by employees for the buy-out earned public recognition of and support for this kind of 
ownership. These cases also helped advisors, politicians and interest advocates special-
ised in employee ownership gain practical experience and strengthen their positions in 
their own markets.  
 
b) Social Partners 
The attitudes of top managers towards ownership and privatization are rather difficult 
to separate in this historical situation. They supported private ownership as early as in 
the economic and political debates around the change of the regime. 
From the very beginning of privatization they were against centralised privatization. In 
an organised way, from 1991 under the leadership of the Association of Managers, they 
urged that a privatization technique should be developed which would favour specifi-
cally the management; this they achieved with the legalisation of MBO in 1995.At the 
same time, managers of primarily small an medium sized companies were happy with 
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techniques of creating majority employee ownership and become owners cheaper and 
without personal risk and responsibility. Furthermore, the cooperation of managers 
and subordinates in ownership was in line with the Hungarian traditional intra-
enterprise relations. Also, at the price of meeting tough profit requirements, ESOP was 
a good possibility for the management to preserve their comfortable position gained in 
the 1980s when they were not required to really fulfil ownership functions (that time 
some of the ownership rights were exercised by Enterprise Councils and Assemblies 
made up of company managers and subordinates).  
Our empirical study investigating the privatization process found that the main goal of 
the management in all cases was to keep the whole enterprise (or parts of it that they 
considered valuable) in one and avoid external ownership control and retain the deci-
sion-making autonomy of the management4. The importance attached to ownership 
control is highlighted by the fact that in almost all cases the management wanted ma-
jority ownership. They insisted on a majority unnecessarily big for influencing decision-
making, and even if majority ownership involved unaffordable costs or unrealistic 
profit requirements to repay loans. 
Similar are the findings of an empirical research by Rozgonyi and Jávor (1996)5. The 
authors emphasize that of the various groups of employees, managers were the most 
prone to lose their jobs and positions when the ownership or activity profile of the 
company changed the smallest bit. An important part of employees regarded employee 
ownership the only acceptable form of privatization in order to avoid foreign owner-
ship.  
According to a report of the Hungarian State Audit Office managers most often used 
the technique of ESOP for buy-out. 6 Their most important motivations were being 
able to keep powerful positions, earn profits, invest, keep jobs as well as maintain the 
culture of the given profession and emotional considerations. Fear of existential uncer-
tainty and the wish to prevent buy-out by competitors also played a role (László, 2004). 
The outcome of the individual privatization transactions and post-privatization selling, 
however, can only be understood through the power relations at the given company 
and the personal ambitions and relation networks of managers. In several cases acquir-
ing employee ownership was a tool to stop a rival manager. In other cases, however, 
                                                 
4  In 1993, on the request of the State Property Agency the findings of an empirical study were 
summarized. The study covered five early cases of ESOP programs.  Selected companies included 
both profit making and losing enterprises and manufacturers (machine, rubber and plastics and 
textile industry) and trading companies (agricultural machinery, foreign trade); also, the enterprises 
were of very different sizes (Boda-Neumann, 1999). 
5  Jávor and Rozgonyi researched the employee buy-out in five enterprises with different profiles in 
1996. Out of 370 interviewed employees at four companies 202 answered the questions on their 
opinion and information concerning privatization.  
6  According to the memories of a former leader of Rész-vétel Foundation representing ESOP com-
panies, about half of company managers used ESOP as the cover for management buy-out. Half 
of the rest of the managers realised over time that they did not have to really share ownership with 




the entrepreneurial attitude of the manager acquiring ownership over assets lasted only 
as long as retirement age came.  
Subordinate employees mostly did not seriously demand participation in strategic and 
ownership decision-making. Especially if their ownership amounted to only a few per-
cents, to sell shares the quickest possible was much more frequently the objective. 
Given the rapidly shrinking real wages in those years, no wonder that employees 
wanted some quick supplementary income. Thus in the course of privatization, em-
ployee representatives first of all concentrated on this kind of revenue, which can be 
called ‘a one time privatization bonus’. More stable forms of employee ownership (ma-
jority shares packet, ESOP) were created where managers could promise fair treatment 
and hold out the image of a company using redundancy measures only as a last resort. 
Subordinates saw ESOP (and other durable buy-out schemes) as a tool to preserve 
their workplace even though the management organising the buy-out made it clear well 
in time that employees were buying shares not jobs. Highly qualified employees used to 
being in a good labour market position also hoped that their work organisations and 
interest advocacy positions would remain unchanged if they managed to prevent exter-
nal buy-out. 
As far as motivations to become owners are concerned, for survey questions most em-
ployees (two thirds of respondents) answered that they expected that ESOP would 
help preserve the workplace and keep the job. Most employees said they are willing to 
take part in shaping the conditions directly affecting them (such as labour relations, 
working conditions, financial incentive systems). The authors conclude that mostly 
employees with higher educational attainment judge correctly the possibilities related to 
becoming co-owners. (Rozgonyi and Jávor, 1996) 
At the national level, trade unions participated in the elaboration of the various forms 
of employee ownership. Local unions, however, were often surprisingly passive and 
limited action to declare their interest in employee buy-out but did not play any role in 
organising the procedure, and obediently did what the managers told them to do. In 
other cases, however, local trade unions actively lobbied for preferential shares as well 
as for ESOP buy-out.  
In addition to influencing privatization decisions, unions usually had at least one of 
their leaders as member of the ESOP trust-organising committee. . While the trade un-
ion formally did not participate in organising and running the ESOP at any of the 
companies, due to personal overlaps ESOP and employee representation were tightly 
interconnected at most workplaces. The management often tried to separate ESOP 
from interest representation (‘This time let us represent workers as owners rather than 
as employees!’) but it never succeeded to perfectly achieve this objective.7 
 
                                                 
7  The American practice of the heydays of trade unions - whereby the conditions of becoming 
owner and the exercise of rights is settled in a collective agreement between the management and 
the trade union - is unimaginable in Hungary. 
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c) The Current National Policy 
On the whole, in Hungary there is no definite public policy either on the employees’s 
financial participation or on the employee ownership. While most of the political par-
ties (both left and right) declare their commitment to the issue, concrete economic pol-
icy decisions are still missing. It seems that the legalisation and dissemination of em-
ployee’s ownership needed the impetus of privatization that mobilised and at the same 
time divided the whole society. 
In 1998 the privatization of the competitive sector was practically over. Lobbyists have 
been fighting for political support and financial encouragement for ESOP ‘outside pri-
vatization’ ever since but without any success, including the goal to make the technique 
applicable in case of liquidation. Furthermore, emphasising the international trend of 
individual account based pension system; plans to encourage tying employee owner-
ship to pension fund membership have gone so far unnoticed. 
Early regulation focused on asset acquisition, and power and interest relations at that 
time did not allow to address the problems of operation. Several problems of impor-
tance were solved in 2003, through the amendment of ESOP Law. It established a 
limit for differences in share distribution, regulated the operation of ESOP trust and 
the mechanism of owners’ interest representation. Another important effort of lobby-
ists was to amend other laws (e.g. tax laws) to make sure that the unfavourable eco-
nomic environment would not undermine the operation of existing ESOP enterprises. 
The latest illustration is the putting on the agenda of the privatization of out-patient 
health care services and organizing ESOP companies. Nevertheless, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty around the program, not the least because of the recent referendum 
on the ban of the privatization of the health care system.   
In the near future other forms of financial participation may penetrate in Hungary 
through the human resource management practise of multinational companies. So far 
the Approved Employee’s Benefit Program is the only financial policy instrument 
which supports such company initiatives.  Despite its limited implementation, it already 
shows that a ‘European Model of Financial Participation’ would have a great effect on 
dissemination due to the overwhelming presence of multinational enterprises in Hun-
gary.  
2. Types of Schemes and their Legal Foundations 
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2. Types of Schemes and their Legal Foundations 
 
a) Privatization on Preferential Terms Schemes 
The first important step towards the introduction of market economy in Hungary was 
the Law on Business Associations of 1988.8 This law gave the legal basis for privatiza-
tion, and large State companies were transformed into limited liability companies and 
joint-stock companies. However, already before the transformation, a decree of the 
Ministerial Council9 allowed employee ownership by means of property notes (in Hun-
garian ‘vagyonjegyek’) (see Boda and Neumann, 1999, p. 39). The law categorized it as 
security, and employees of the company could acquire it free of charge.10 Companies 
could issue such property notes free of charge for employees only on the debit of the 
after tax profit, maximum up to 10% of the total assets of the company.11 As there was 
no comprehensive regulation and plan on the process of privatization during this pe-
riod, this period (between 1988 and 1990) is called ‘spontaneous privatization’ by the 
Hungarian technical literature (see Báger and Kovács, 2004, p. 101). Growing need for 
legal control of the privatization resulted in the establishment of the State Property 
Agency.12 The first privatization program was launched by this Agency following the 
British privatization model (see Báger and Kovács, 2004, p. 104). The new government 
in principle allowed all kind of privatization techniques, under the strict control of the 
State Property Agency. However, the most supported was the auction privatization 
technique (see Boda and Neumann, 1999, p. 20). Yet, it should be mentioned that in 
1992 the support of the society for privatization has washed-out as many times it was 
seen as the main reason for layoffs (see Boda and Neumann, 1999, p. 24). During early 
nineties, the most popular ‘tools’ of privatization for employees were privatization 
credit, the ‘Egzisztencia’ credit and using compensation note for privatization. 
The next government brought a new Law on Privatization in 1995,13 that narrowed 
allowances for employees, but at the same time it offered new forms and techniques 
                                                 
8  Law VI of 1988 on Business Associations (repealed by Law CXLIV of 1997 on Business Associa-
tions). 
9  Decree of the Ministerial Council 94 of 1988 on Property Notes. However, such property notes 
were issue-able only until May 15, 1993. Ibid Section 1 (4). Later they were transferred either to 
shares or companies were obliged to buy them from their owners (see Boda and Neumann, 1999, 
p. 40). 
10  Section 1 (2) and 2 (1) of the Decree of the Ministerial Council 94 of 1988 on Property Notes. 
11  Ibid Section 6 (1). 
12  This Agency was established by Law VII of 1990 on State Property Agency and on the Mainte-
nance and Utilization of the Related Property. It should be mentioned that besides legal acts, so-
called ‘property-political guidelines’ and inside regulations of the State Property Agency had an 
important influence on the privatization process. 
13  Law XXXIX of 1995 on Realization of Entrepreneurial Property in State Ownership. This Law 
gave a legal framework for privatization, however in practice the privatization was implemented 
through the decisions of the State Property Agency. In practice, one of the problematic issues was 
how to secure financial sources for preferential privatization (e.g., because many times the State 
Extended Country Report Hungary 
 
 12 
(Lukács, 2004, 9.5.1.3). This law is still in force, and it enumerates preferential privati-
zation techniques. These are the following:14 (1) privatization on deferred terms, (2) 
privatization leasing,15 (3) managerial and employee buyout,16 (4) employee privatiza-
tion on preferential terms, (5) ‘Egzisztencia’ credit and (6) ESOP.17 
Privatization on deferred terms: incentive to pay on deferred terms for the privatized (ac-
quired) property can be granted for maximum fifteen years period.18 The interest rate 
on such credit cannot be less than 50% of the all time official national bank interest 
rate.19 The ownership passes to the buyer with the payment of the first instalment.20 
Employee privatization on preferential terms. In the context of privatization on preferential 
terms during the privatization of State property, according to the law in force, it is pos-
sible to grant discount up to the amount of 150% of the annual minimal pay. However, 
the nominal value of shares acquired this way may not exceed 15% of the company’s 
registered capital and the discount granted may not be above 50% of the purchase 
price. This allowance can be used either individually, or in organized form.21 It was 
popular during the so-called simplified privatization to employees of small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises (Lukács, 2004, 9.5.1.1). 
‘Egisztencia’ credit22 can be taken up to 50% of the property that want to be acquired, 
and maximum up to 50 million HUF, regardless the number of buyers.23 The law also 
sets up criteria for eligibility of taking such credit:24 
- the applicant for such credit has to qualify for domestic person under foreign ex-
change laws (see Lukács, 2004, 9.5.2.5) or legal persons with exclusively having do-
mestic persons as members and being registered in Hungary, 
- the applicant has to comply with the credit awarding requirements of credit institu-
tions, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Property Agency did not fulfill its obligations prescribed by the law). Another issue was that the 
State Property Agency was organized in a business entity form (joint-stock company) and was not 
part of the State administration. Thus, its decisions were not challengeable as administrative deci-
sions. 
14  Section 46 of Law XXXIX of 1995 on Realization of Entrepreneurial Property in State Owner-
ship. 
15  This technique is not discussed here because of the reasons mentioned under note 3 supra. 
16  See ibid. 
17  See infra part 2 b). 
18  Section 46 (2) of Law XXXIX of 1995 on Realization of Entrepreneurial Property in State Owner-
ship. 
19  Ibid Section 46 (4). 
20  Ibid Section 46 (5). 
21  Ibid Section 55-57. 
22  See also infra ‘Egisztencia’ credit notes. 
23  Section 58 (3) of Law XXXIX of 1995 on Realization of Entrepreneurial Property in State Owner-
ship. This rule applies to ESOP credits as well. 
24  Ibid Section 59 (1) (3). 
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- the same applicant may take within three years only once credit, 
- the applicant disposes with adequate financial source for the transaction, 
- the property bought on the credit may be alienated only with the consent of the 
credit institution until the credit is not repaid. 
 
b) Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) 
In Hungary the establishment and functioning of ESOPs is regulated by Law XLIV of 
1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program, which entered into force on July 14, 1992.25 
The preamble of the law itself says that the aim of ESOP is the acceleration and fur-
therance of the privatization process.26 The American ESOP system had a strong in-
fluence on the preparation of this law, and basically Hungarian ESOPs followed the 
American ‘trust’ model (see Luxne and Szucs 1993, p. 9; Boda and Neumann, 1999, p. 
45). However, there is a major difference between the two systems: in Hungary ESOP 
is a privatization form with the organization ceasing to exist as soon as all the securities 
are paid for, and their ownership is transferred to the employees.27 In the United 
States, an ESOP is an organization that administers securities of employees, and that 
does not cease to exist when the credits are repaid.28 We are on the opinion that the 
American system should be followed at least regarding the goals of such an organiza-
tion. 
According to statistics, companies with ESOP organization, on average, are financially 
more successful than those not in partial or full employee ownership (see Lukács, 
2004, 9.5.2.2). Though, studies show that the huge majority of ESOP buyouts are in 
practice management buyouts (see Galgóczi and Hovorka, 1998, p. 4). As far as remu-
neration is concerned, employees employed with companies in partial or full employee 
ownership earned 144% of the pay of employees of companies not in such ownership 
in year 2000 (see Lukács, 2004, 9.5.2.2). However, during the last few years there were 
no new ESOPs established, partly because this form was linked to privatization of 
State property, and partly because of lack of tax and other benefits related to the ‘re-
freshment’ of membership of ESOP organization.29 Entrepreneurial prohibition pre-
                                                 
25  Amended with Law CXIX of 2003 on Amendment of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share 
Ownership Program. 
26  Preamble of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
27  Section 24 (1) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
28  For the ESOP organization that exercises ownership rights, basically the American ‘trust’ model 
was used (see Boda and Neumann 1999, p. 45; Mocsáry, 1998, p. 63). Another difference was be-
tween the American and Hungarian regulation that under the 1992 ESOP Law there were no ‘fair-
ness’ rules (this led to disproportionately large manager ownership). However, this was changed 
with the 2003 Amendments. It should be also noted that the ESOP Law do not differentiate be-
tween employees and managers.  
29  It also happened that the management used the employees to gain ESOP related benefits during 
the establishment of the organisation. Following the purchase of shares the management restruc-
tured the company (at the same time slicing the old company), replaced some employees to newly 
Extended Country Report Hungary 
 
 14 
scribed by the law on ESOPs was also impediment of their flexible functioning and 
further development (see Mocsáry, 1998, p. 69). The new amendment to the ESOP law 
states that: ‘the organisation can pursue other economic activities only to help to 
achieve its goals.’30 Though, this amendment constitutes progress compared to the old 
text of the law, this provision is still too vague. 
Hungarian literature distinguishes between two kinds of ESOPs: so-called ‘privatiza-
tion’ and ‘non-privatization’ ESOPs (see Szakértői Munkaközösség [Experts Panel], 
1990, pp. 49-50). In the case of the former, the ESOP organization buys the property 
of the State Property Agency or that of the municipalities and there are incentives re-
lated to this form. In the case of the latter, shares or business shares that are not at the 
disposal of State Property Agency are sold, e.g., already existing securities or securities 
issued in the case of capital increase (ibid) also foreseen by the ESOP law. However, as 
there are no specific incentives related to non-privatization ESOP, it does not encour-
age companies and employees to establish non-privatization ESOPs. 
 
(1) Coverage and Prerequisites 
There can be made distinction between privatization and non-privatization ESOPs 
only regarding incentives. Otherwise, the provisions of the Law XLIV of 1992 on Em-
ployee Share Ownership Program apply to both forms. ESOP organization can be es-
tablished in any limited liability company or joint-stock company (except financial insti-
tutions and insurance companies) registered in Hungary.31 Anybody can initiate the es-
tablishment of an ESOP organisation, the person even does not have to be employee 
of the company (see Lukács, 1993, p. 22). However, to participate in the organisation 
the person has to be employed by the given company at least in half of the official 
work time32 and has to have existing employment relation with the company for at least 
six months (even a longer time, but maximum five years, can be required by the statute 
of the ESOP organisation).33 According to the original ESOP law of 1992, retired em-
ployees had to secede from ESOP. This was unjust and disadvantageous for these em-
ployees, as because of long repayment period they could not have their share of the 
profit (see Mocsáry, 1998, p. 68). However, the 2003 amendment of the Law has 
changed this situation, and now the retired employee can decide if he/she wants to 
remain member of the ESOP.34 
                                                                                                                                                    
established companies that are separate legal entities, so the ESOP membership of these employ-
ees ceased. Also, there can be abuse during the distribution of securities, as this issue is allowed by 
the law to be regulated in an agreement made by the members of the ESOP organisation. See Moc-
sáry (1998, p. 68-70). 
30  Section 16 (1) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
31  Section 1 (1) (7) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
32  The official work time in Hungary is 40 hours per week. Section 117/B (1) of Law XXII of 1992 
on Labour Code. 
33  Section 1 (2) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
34  Section 1 (4) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
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To establish an ESOP organization, the first prerequisite is a written declaration of at 
least 25% of the company’s employees, in which they state that they wish to acquire 
securities of the company.35 Following this, the employees of the company elect a three 
member organizing committee.36  Support of the company management is not re-
quired, however, it is desirable (see Luxne and Szucs 1993, p. 9). The organising com-
mittee’s duty is to negotiate with the potential seller (company) and with potential 
creditors (e.g., banks).37 It has also to prepare a feasibility study, in which it examines 
the financial situation of the company to see if the company will be able to carry the 
financial burden of the program.38 This study has to be countersigned by the represen-
tative of the company.39 Afterwards, the committee prepares the credit application and 
the purchase offer. If the credit institution approves the plan, the organising committee 
negotiates the conditions of securities’ purchase with the company owner. It can pre-
pare a draft of the purchase contract. The committee is also responsible for the pre-
paratory legal work related to the establishment of the ESOP organisation, e.g., drafting 
of the proposal of the statutes. Finally, it convenes the statutory meeting (members’ 
meeting) of the future ESOP organisation.40 At this meeting, at least 40% of employees 
of all the employees of the company have to agree on the establishment of the ESOP 
organisation and adopt the statute of the organisation.41 At the same meeting the 
members elect the board of the ESOP organisation that will represent it, as with the 
establishment of the organisation the organising committee ceases to exist.42 
The new representatives have the duty to register the organisation at the competent 
county court or at the Municipal Court of Budapest.43 With the registration the organi-
sation becomes legal entity, established with the purpose of acquiring shares in the 
business organisation where the members of the ESOP organisation are employed, 
with registered members and self-government.44 Thus, it is a non-profit organisation 
under the supervision of the office of the public prosecutor.45 The highest decision-
                                                 
35  Ibid Section 2 (1). 
36  Ibid. 
37  Section 1 (1) and 3 (1) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
38  Ibid Section 2 (3). 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid Section 3 (3). 
41  Ibid Section 4 (3). 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid Section 6 (1). Any subsequent amendment in the statute or in the data of the organization has 
to be reported to the court in 30 days (Section 6 (3) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share 
Ownership Program). 
44  Section 4 (1) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
45  Ibid Section 11. It may pursue only limited economic activity (see Galgóczi and Hovorka, 1998, p. 
4). 
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making organ of the organisation is the members’ meeting,46 which has exclusive com-
petence (among others) on the following issues:47 
- laying down and amendment of the provisions of the statute,  
- adoption of the annual budget, 
- election, recall, remuneration of the representatives (board) of the organisation, 
- adoption of the annual report of the board, 
- establishment of proportion of property share of participants in the program, 
- decision on the acceptance of the conditions of the credit. 
Decisions of the meeting require simple majority.48 An employee can be member of 
only one ESOP organisation at the same time.49 It is possible that in one business or-
ganisation there are two ESOPs functioning (only two, because of the 40% employee 
support requirement). There is no provision of the law that would exclude new mem-
bers (new employees or old ones that did not want to join the organisation at the time 
it was established) to become members of the ESOP organisation. After the ESOP has 
been established, it can conclude purchase agreement with the seller, and credit agree-
ment with the credit institution. Following the conclusion of the purchase agreement, 
the ESOP organisation becomes owner of the securities. The ESOP organisation as 
legal entity takes the loan from the creditor or agrees on the terms of payment of in-
stalments with the seller. The organisation has full liability for its obligations.50 Mem-
bers of the organisation are not liable for debts of the organisation except with the se-
curities already allocated to them.51 
The organisation ceases to exist: 
- when the ownership of all the shares is transferred to the employees of the ESOP 
organisation,52  
- if after the repayment of the credit the annual average number of ESOP members 
is under 25% of the total number of employees of the company, or  
- if the company where the ESOP is organised ceases to exist.53  
However, as long as all the securities are not paid for they cannot be sold or trans-
ferred to the members of the organisation.54  
                                                 
46  Ibid Section 7 (1). 
47  Ibid Section 7 (2). 
48  Ibid Section 7 (5). 
49  Ibid Section 4 (4). 
50  Ibid Section 13. 
51  Ibid. 
52  In this regard the English model was followed, meaning that following the payment of shares, eve-
rybody can dispose freely with his/her shares (see Boda and Neumann, 1999, p. 26). 
53  Ibid Section 24 (1) (2) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 




It should be repeatedly emphasised that any incentive is applicable only to ‘privatiza-
tion’ ESOPs. ‘ESOP’ credit is available to employees on preferential terms, however, 
own resources of the organisation must be at least 2%.55 The pertinent decree56 states 
that preferential credit can be used among others by ESOP organizations for privatiza-
tion of State property. If the securities are sold by the State Property Agency, and the 
Agency uses the income from the sale for the repayment of State debt, the ESOP or-
ganisation can resort to preferential credit or instalment payment plan.57 Another re-
quirement is that limited liability companies and joint-stock companies be in majority 
State ownership. The terms of the credit58 are set as follows: 
Amount of credit Own sources (in % of the 





Up to 5 million HUF 2 15 3 
Above 5 million HUF 15 15 3 
* During the grace period only the interest of the credit has to be paid. 
 
(3) Taxation 
There is no tax allowance or other neither for employees or the ESOP organisation 
nor for the company (only the above mentioned incentives for privatization ESOPs) 
(see Lukács, 2004, 9.5.2.5). The only exemption is, that the company where the ESOP 
is established (provided the employees purchased State property, that is to say, it is a 
‘privatization’ ESOP) can resort to tax allowance for the property sold to the ESOP 
organisation prescribed by the Corporate Tax Law (see Lukács, 2004, 9.5.2.5). Accord-
ingly, the company is entitled for tax base allowance up to 20% of the amount of the 
tax base (without this amount). Thus, amounts paid to ESOP organisation can be de-
ducted up to 20% from the company’s tax base. 
ESOPs were not subject to corporate profit tax until December 31, 1996. However, 
following this date, the income of ESOP organisations falls under the rules of the Law 
on Corporate Tax and Dividend Tax, and accordingly 16% tax is paid on the tax base 
income of the organisation for every tax year following the tax year.59 However, two 
special rules apply when calculating the tax base of ESOPs: (1) the tax base should be 
reduced by the amounts paid in by private persons as their own contribution to the 
ESOP organisation and by amounts of subsidy paid in by other private or legal per-
                                                                                                                                                    
54  Ibid Section 18 (3). 
55  Section 8 (2) of Governmental Decree 28 of 1991 on ‘Egzisztencia’ Credit and Deferred Payments 
Benefits. 
56  Ibid Section 3 (1). 
57  Section 15 (1) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
58  Section 8 (2) of the Governmental Decree 28 of 1991 on ‘Egzisztencia’ Credit and Deferred Pay-
ments Benefits. 
59  Section 2 (2) (e) and 19 (1) of Law LXXXI of 1996 on Corporate Tax and Dividend Tax. 
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sons, or by the company employing the members of the ESOP (otherwise these 
amounts should have been accounted as income). (2) At the same time, the tax base 
has to be increased by the acquisition value of the shares given to the ownership of 
members of the ESOP organisation – on the pretence of transferring means without 
compensation, that amount is accounted among expenditures (reducing the profit) ac-
cording to the rules of accounting (see Földes, 2005, p. 573). 
According to Personal Income Tax Law,60 securities transferred from the company to 
the employees (as part of the ESOP)61 are tax free, such securities are not considered 
income.62 However, at the time of sale of such securities by the employee, the income 
from this sale is considered capital gain and taxable at a rate of 20% (or 35%).63 
 
(4) Link to Participation in Decision-Making 
In Hungary the law does not make distinction between companies in employee (or in 
partial employee) ownership and those that are not in such ownership. All registered 
companies fall under the Law on Business Associations,64 and there is equal treatment 
under the law of companies regarding the method of decision-making.65 However, it 
                                                 
60  Personal income tax in Hungary is based on a progressive scale from 18 to 38%:  
Amount of income: Tax and tax rate: 
0-1,500,000 HUF 18% 
From 1,500,001 HUF  270,000 HUF plus 38% of the portion above 1,500,000 HUF 
(Section 30. Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax, on Feb. 28, 2005). 
61  Any individual who either has permanent residency in Hungary or whose temporary residency ex-
ceeds 183 days in a given tax year (calendar year) has an unlimited tax liability (also qualify for 
‘domestic person’ under foreign exchange laws) under Hungarian income tax law. The amount of 
tax paid is based on the individual’s total revenue, regardless of origin. A foreigner temporarily 
resident in Hungary, however, has a limited tax liability: The amount of tax paid is based only on 
revenue gained from work performed and other revenue obtained in Hungary (Section 2 of Law 
CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax). Hungary is party to a Treaty for the Prevention of 
Double Taxation with several countries which basically follows the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development model. These tax treaties allow taxpayers to pay reduced tax rates 
on income earned by submitting a duly issued ‘certificate of residency’ confirming the taxpayer’s 
primary tax residence abroad. Any Double Taxation Prevention Treaty takes precedence over the 
Hungarian Personal Income Tax Law (Section 2 (5) of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income 
Tax). 
62  Section 18 (4) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
63  Section 66 of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax; Securities acquired from already taxed 
personal income of the participant of the program are not taxable. 
64  Law CXLIV of 1997 on Business Associations. 
65  The highest decision-making body of the limited liability company is the members’ meeting and in 
case of joint-stock company is the shareholders’ meeting. (Ibid Section 18 (1)) Quorum rules re-
quire more than half of all the shares (both for limited liability company and joint-stock company) 
to be represented (Ibid Section 236). However, the articles of incorporation may require higher 
rate. If there is no quorum at the first meeting, the second, repeated meeting can bring decision re-
garding issues that were on the agenda of the first meeting without having quorum. As a general 
rule, decisions are brought by majority vote (Ibid Section 19 (1)). In case of joint-stock company, 
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might be that the articles of incorporation give more rights to employee owners (e.g., 
issuing preferential shares). In practice, usually employee shareholders or the ESOP 
organisation does not have any advantage or disadvantage regarding participation, but 
they take part in the process of decision-making proportionately to their shares (see 
Boda and Neumann, 1999, p. 80). 
More specifically, regarding ESOP organisations as already mentioned above, the or-
ganisation is the owner of the shares. Concerning exercise of property rights, partici-
pants have voting rights in the proportion of their registered shares, but maximum up 
to 5% of the property acquired by the ESOP organisation.66 However, in many issues 
related to decision-making in ESOP organisation the law gives a large freedom to the 
members of the organisation to establish ‘internal’ rules in this field.67 Rights of par-
ticipation that result from the ownership of shares by the ESOP organisation are exer-
cised through the representative of the organisation, however the articles of incorpora-
tion can stipulate differently.68  
 
c) Employees’ Shares 
Employees’ shares were first introduced by the Law on Business Associations of 
1988.69 Employees’ shares can be issued free of charge or at reduced price in accor-
dance with the provisions of the articles of incorporation (statutes) of the joint-stock 
company.70 They are registered shares.71 Such shares may be issued with a simultane-
ous share capital increase of the joint-stock company, up to 15% of the increased share 
capital at the most.72 A joint-stock company may pass a resolution on the issue of such 
employees’ shares which entitles their holders to dividends from after-tax profits to be 
distributed among shareholders prior to the shares belonging to other categories or 
                                                                                                                                                    
there are only few issues that require ¾ majority: (1) adoption and amendment of the articles of 
incorporation, (2) changing the form of the company, (3) winding up the company and (4) amend-
ing rights related to shares. (Ibid Section 237 (3)) 
66  Section 7 (6) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
67  Having examined the statute of a Hungarian ESOP organization, that was established at a Hungar-
ian foreign trade company, it can be concluded, as already pointed out above, that these organiza-
tions were used more as privatization form (technique) than a participation instrument of employ-
ees in the company. The statue only mentions the right to participation of members in the deci-
sion-making in the company: ‘member has the right to exercise shareholders rights through the 
representative of the ESOP organization.’ However, the exact procedure is not regulated (nonethe-
less, some other procedures are regulated in detail in this document). Supposedly, decision-making 
is similar to other procedures, and members take part in the management of the company by the 
way of an elected representative. See also Boda and Neumann (1999, pp. 80-86). 
68  Section 17 (1) of Law XLIV of 1992 on Employee Share Ownership Program. 
69  Section 44 of Law VI of 1988 on Business Associations. 
70  Section 187 (1) of Law CXLIV of 1997 on Business Associations. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid Section 187 (2). 
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classes of shares, but following shares granting preferred dividends.73 However, the 
main idea of this special type of shares is to ensure the possibility for employees to ac-
quire cheaper shares of their company.74 
 
(1) Coverage and Prerequisites 
Employee shares are registered shares, and can be acquired only by full time or part 
time employees or group of employees of the company.75 Employees’ shares may be 
transferred only to the employees of the joint-stock company, or to persons whose 
employment relationship is terminated due to retirement.76 In the event of death of an 
employee or the termination of his/her employment relationship, excluding the case of 
retirement, his/her heir or former employer shall have the right to transfer the em-
ployees’ shares in question to other employees of the company within a period of six 
months.77 If this deadline expires without success, at the first shareholders’ meeting 
thereafter, the company shall withdraw the employees’ shares in question with a corre-
sponding reduction of its share capital, or shall decide to sell such shares after trans-
forming such into ordinary shares, or preference or interest-bearing shares.78 Thus, the 
limited transferability of this kind of shares reduces its value. 
 
(2) Taxation and Incentives 
The company issuing such shares can give up to 90% discount by the purchase of 
these shares, which makes this form of financial participation very attractive for em-
ployees. However, there are no tax incentives related to this form of share acquisition 
(see Lukács, 2004, 9.5.1.3). From January 1, 2003 income received in the form of secu-
rities is not regarded any more as allowance in nature. The applicable rules of taxation 
are determined by the legal relationship between the private person and the provider. 
In case of securities provided by employer to employee, such income is considered as 
income from employment, and pertinent tax rules has to be applied.79 Thus, in case of 
employees’ shares, the difference between the purchase price and the sale price falls 
under personal income tax.80 
 
                                                 
73  Ibid Section 187 (1). 
74  According to research done by the National Employment Office of Hungary, employee share 
ownership is insignificant in Hungary. Interview with Dr. László Neumann (Budapest, February 
10, 2005). 
75  Ibid Section 187 (1) of Law CXLIV of 1997 on Business Associations. 
76  Ibid Section 187 (2). 
77  Ibid Section 187 (4). 
78  Ibid. 
79  See Informant of the Tax and Financial Control Administration (APEH) on the Rules on Securities 
Allowance in Force from January 1, 2003. Source: Hungarian CD Jogtar (Feb. 28, 2005). 
80  Ibid. 
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(3) Participation in Decision-Making 
As already mentioned supra in the part dealing with ESOP organizations, the law does 
not make any distinction between shareholders of the same class, thus participation of 
employees with the ownership of employee shares is the same as any other common 
shareholder’s. 
 
d) Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program 
From January 1, 2003 new legislation entered into force (with some provisions in force 
from January 1, 2004) allowing companies to set up State-recognized, tax-qualified 
stock plans. Relevant provisions can be found in Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income 
Tax and in the Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on the Procedure of Registration of 
Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and on the Rate of Administration Service Fee for 
the Initiation of the Procedure. If the Ministry of Finance approves the program, it informs 
the competent Tax Authorities about its decision.81  However, the deposit custodian, 
or in some cases the organizer of the program is under duty to supply data to the Tax 
Authorities within fifteen days from the date the security82 ceases to be in deposit for 
the employee, or if it is transferred to new deposit custodian.83 
 
(1) Coverage and Prerequisites 
The business association itself initiates and organizes such a program.84 The organizer 
of the employee securities benefit program has to submit an application for the recog-
nition of the program as an approved program85 to the Ministry of Finance.86 To be 
approved, the program must meet the following conditions:87 
- only securities issued by the applicant company or by its majority shareholder may 
be offered in the program, 
                                                 
81  Section 10 of the Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on Procedure of Registration of 
Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and the Rate of Administration Service Fee for 
the Initiation of the Procedure. 
82  These shares are common shares, and may be issued only by companies registered at the Stock 
Exchange. 
83  See Informant of the Tax and Financial Control Administration (APEH) No. 8001 of 2003 on 
Supplying of Data and Reporting Duty Related to Approved Employee Securities Benefit Pro-
gram. 
84  Section 77/C (24) (e) of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
85  The law states that ‘approved programs’ are those which are registered as such with the Ministry of 
Finance. See Section 77/C (24) (a) of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
86  Section 3 of Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on Procedure of Registration of Ap-
proved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and on the Rate of Administration Service Fee for 
the Initiation of the Procedure. 
87  Section 77/C (19) of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
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- the program has to contain the program organizer’s absolute and irrevocable com-
mitment to fulfil the program, 
- the program may offer securities only to employees and executive officers of the 
company, 
- employee participation in the program must cover at least 10% of the average 
number of employees registered in the year preceding the year in which the applica-
tion is submitted,  
- executives cannot make up more than 25% of the total participants and they cannot 
be given more than 50% of the total share value. 
The appointed auditor (or his/her close relatives) of the applicant business association 
and the issuer and supervisory board members (or their close relatives) are not permit-
ted to obtain any securities under the program. Neither the chief executive officer of 
the applicant business association and the issuer nor his/her close relatives are permit-
ted to obtain securities under the program.88 
The application has to contain89 data on the organizer, a detailed description of the 
program, a signed declaration of employees participating in the program with their 
data,90 data on the deposit custodian and a declaration of the organizer. In the declara-
tion91 the organizer declares to fulfil the program if approved, not to sell securities to 
persons enumerated by the law, to have published financial reports during the previous 
three years92 and not to have been under insolvency proceeding93 during the same pe-
riod. The application has to contain also a draft frame-contract between the program 
organizer and the deposit custodian, and a single draft contract among the program 
organizer, the deposit custodian and the employee.94 The application shall be counter-
                                                 
88  Ibid. 
89  Annex to the Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on Procedure of Registration of 
Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and on the Rate of Administration Service Fee 
for the Initiation of the Procedure. 
90  This declaration shall contain the nominal value of the securities the employee wants to acquire 
and declaration that the employee is familiar with the conditions of the program. 
91  Section 5 of Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on Procedure of Registration of Ap-
proved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and on the Rate of Administration Service Fee for 
the Initiation of the Procedure. 
92  The applicant company and the issuer (or their successor) had to publish annual reports, contain-
ing the auditor’s endorsement, for the last three financial years prior to the submission of the ap-
plication in compliance with the legal requirements prescribed by the law of the State in which it is 
established. 
93  Or liquidation proceedings or equivalent proceedings under its own law. Section 77/C (19) of the 
Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
94  Section 77/C (2) of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
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signed by an attorney at law or tax advisor.95 The fee of the application is 500,000 
HUF.96 
 
(2) Taxation and Incentives 
At the time of sale, the employee is subject to tax on the spread between the exercise 
price and the sale price. Such capital gain is taxed at 20%, separately from other in-
come.97 Companies have no withholding or reporting obligations in connection with 
employee stock option or purchase plans. The first HUF 500,000 of the shares that 
have met the vesting requirements are not taxable at exercise or vesting.98 Any shares 
deemed non-qualified are taxed as normal employment income (see Lukács, 2004, 
9.5.2.5). 
 
(3) Link to Participation in Decision-Making 
Once employees exercise the shares, the shares must be held in a security account 
overseen by a custodian, and there is an obligatory three years vesting period which 
ends on December 31 of the second year subsequent to providing securities.99 Follow-




Following the Second World War, co-operatives came into being in Hungary by the 
will of the State (see Gál et al., 2002, p. 17). Following the transition, laws on co-
operatives treated co-operatives practically as business associations (see Lukács, 2004, 
9.5.1.1). The property of ‘old’ co-operatives was divided between members, ex-
members and their heirs in form of registered shares.100 
                                                 
95  See Annex to the Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on the Procedure of Registra-
tion of Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and on the Rate of Administration Ser-
vice Fee for the Initiation of the Procedure. 
96  Section 12 (1) of Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 5 of 2003 on the Procedure of Registra-
tion of Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program, and on the Rate of Administration Ser-
vice Fee for the Initiation of the Procedure; 1 EURO = 249 HUF. Source: Hungarian National 
Bank, web page visited: April 26, 2005 <www.mnb.hu>. 
97  Section 67 of the Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. BTW, allowances in nature are 
taxed at 44% in Hungary (see note 2). However this does not fall into the category of allowances in 
nature. 
98  Section 77/A, 77/C of the Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
99  Section 77/A, 77/C of the Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
100  However, following privatization these property shares in the co-operatives were not extractable in 
parts from co-operatives, it is possible only to sell them as shares from the co-operative. 
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The first law on co-operatives was enacted in 1992. Today, there are two laws on co-
operatives in force, the ‘old’ one of 1992101 and the ‘new’ one, the Law on New Co-
operatives102 that entered into force on January 1, 2001. Following this date, co-
operatives can be established only in accordance with the provisions of the new Law. 
Co-operatives that existed prior to the above date can function in accordance with the 
old Law until December 31, 2006. However, they have to decide until this date 
whether they will keep on functioning as a co-operative (in this case they have to adjust 
to the provisions of the new Law), transform to other form of enterprise or cease to 
exist.103 
In the following we will give only short overview of regulations on co-operatives in 
general, and following that concentrate only on issues that are relevant for our re-
search. Where other is not marked, the provision relates to both old and new Law.  
The old Law defines co-operative as a ‘collective established in accordance with the 
principles of the freedom of association and self-help that pursues, through the per-
sonal participation and financial contribution of members, entrepreneurial and other 
activities serving the interests of members, within the framework of democratic self-
government.’104 Under the new Law it is defined as an organization founded to carry 
on business with predetermined (in the articles of foundation) amount of notes repre-
senting share in the co-operative (‘részjegy’). Its functioning is based on the principle of 
open membership and changing capital that aims the promotion of the economic and 
other activities of its members.105 Co-operatives are legal entities.106 At least five per-
sons (both natural and legal persons)107 are needed to establish a co-operative. The co-
operative comes into existence with registration at the court of registry.108 The co-
operative is represented by the president of the board of directors (or the chief execu-
tive officer if it is a small one) or a member of the board of directors stipulated in the 
                                                 
101  Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives (the ‘old’ law). 
102  Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
103  Ibid Section 89. 
104  Section 3 of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives. 
105  Section 3 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
106  Section 3 of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 3 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-
operatives. 
107  Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives does not allow that the number of legal person members be 
higher than that of natural persons, except if the majority of members are co-operatives. Ibid Sec-
tion 4 (1). The new law is stricter when it states that the percentage of non-natural persons mem-
bers may not reach 50% of the all members, except if all the members are co-operatives. Section 5 
(2) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
108  Section 7 (2) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 11(3) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-
operatives. 
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articles of foundation.109 The articles of foundation can depart from this, and stipulate 
differently representation.110 
 
(1) Coverage and Prerequisites 
The articles of foundation might prescribe a ‘common interest’ that might be the con-
dition for membership,111 however by taking new members and by defining duties and 
rights of members, there cannot be made any kind of discrimination.112 There is a spe-
cial body that decides on the application of new members.113 The law also provides for 
the cases in which membership terminates, however the articles of foundation might 
prescribe other causes as well.114 The member may subscribe to the number and 
amount of notes representing share in the co-operative (‘részjegy’) specified in the by-
laws.115 
According to the old Law each note representing share in the co-operative has to be 
issued on an identical amount. Such note is nontransferable and is not subject to court 
execution if the co-operative member bears liability towards a third party.116 A share 
entitles a holder to receive the appropriate dividend from the after-tax profit of the co-
operative.117 Co-operative members may, apart from subscribing to notes representing 
share in the co-operative, make other forms of financial contributions and may give 
loans on interest to the co-operative.118 Notes representing share in the co-operative 
are transferable and inheritable, and entitle their holders to annual dividends on the 
after-tax profit of the co-operative. No interest is payable on notes representing share 
in the co-operative.119 Provided that a member of the co-operative wishes to transfer 
                                                 
109  Section 11 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 13 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. However, the new Law does not enumerate the chief executive officer. 
110  Section 17 (2) (g) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 13 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
111  Section 42 (3) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 46 (2) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
112  Section 42 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives. The new Law does not mention any kind of 
non-discrimination principle. 
113  This body is constituted by the founding members in the articles of foundation. Section 43 (1) of 
Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 47 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
114  These are: the member dies (or a legal person is terminated), the member resigns, the member is 
excluded, the co-operative transforms to company or the co-operative terminates its operations 
without legal successor. Section 48 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives. The new law enumer-
ates the same reasons, and adds one more: if the member did not fulfil his/her financial contribu-
tion. Section 60 (b) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
115  Section 52 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 53 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
116  Section 53 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives. 
117  Ibid Section 53 (2). 
118  Ibid Section 54 (1). 
119  Ibid Section 56 (1). 
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his/her note representing share in the co-operative to an outsider, the co-operative and 
its members are entitled to the right of preemption. If those who have the right of pre-
emption do not state their claim within 30 days of the announcement of the transfer of 
the equity, it is taken for granted that they do not intend to avail themselves of the 
right.120 The members’ meeting may decide on the purchase by the co-operative of the 
notes representing share in the co-operative a co-operative officer.121 Unless the note-
holder is a member of the co-operative, at the members’ meeting he/she has right of 
say but not vote.122 The co-operative must keep records of the holders of notes repre-
senting share in the co-operative and of the nominal values of these.123 
The new Law does not places such emphasis on the notes representing share in the co-
operative. The new Law only states that the membership and membership rights and 
duties are represented by notes representing rights in the co-operative.124 The new Law 
also obliges the co-operative to have a register of the members and their contribu-
tions.125 However, the Law states that irrespective of their contribution, members have 
the same rights in the co-operative.126 The members’ meeting decides on the dividend 
(on the proposal of the board of directors and the supervisory board) based on the 
economic cooperation with the members.127 
 
(2) Decision-Making and Organs 
The highest decision-making body of the co-operative is the members’ meeting. It 
makes decision in the most important issues related to the co-operative.128 This body 
                                                 
120  Ibid Section 56 (2). 
121  Ibid Section 56 (3). 
122  Ibid Section 56 (4). 
123  Ibid Section 57 (1). 
124  Section 49 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
125  Section 50 of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
126  Section 51 (2) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
127  Section 58 of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
128  These issues are: (1) formulation and amendment of the bylaws; (2) election and relief from duties 
of the members and the chairman of the board of directors; (3) election of the members and 
chairman of the supervisory board and relieving them of their duties; the commissioning and re-
lieving of duties of other persons seeing to their tasks; (4) setting the fees of office holders; (5) de-
termination of the amounts of money represented by shares and the nominal value of co-operative 
quotas; (6) adoption of the annual report and decision-taking on the use of post-tax profits or on 
sources for covering losses; (7) decision-making within the framework of the bylaws on what is to 
happen with indivisible property; (8) decision-making on the fusion, splitting, reorganization or 
dissolution of the co-operative; (9) entry into co-operatives and business organizations, and quit-
ting; foundation of a co-operative or business organization if the assets contributed exceed the 
value defined in the bylaws; (10) entry into an interest organization, and secession from it; (11) de-
cision-making on the starting of court action for damages against an office holder; (12) whatever 
else the bylaws refer to the competence of the members’ meeting. Section 20 (1) of Law I of 1992 
on Co-operatives; Section 22 (1) (2) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
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has to be convened at least once a year. It is convened by the board of directors.129 
Any issue might be put on the agenda on the initiative of at least 10% of all the mem-
bers.130 Concerning quorum rules, at least half of the members have to be present,131 
and if there is no contrary provision in the law or in the articles of foundation or in the 
decision of the members’ meeting, decisions are made with 50% plus one vote of the 
members present at the meeting, with public voting.132  
The board of directors (or if there are less than 50 members it might be the chief ex-
ecutive officer) elected by the members’ meeting, manages everyday activities of the 
co-operative. It forms the working structure, exercises employer rights and makes deci-
sion regarding every issue that is not in the competence of other organs.133 It is ac-
countable and reports to the members’ meeting.134 
The co-operatives have a supervisory board that is also elected by the members’ meet-
ing.135 Its main duty is to supervise the activities of the co-operative.136 
 
(3) Taxation and Incentives 
Regarding taxation of the co-operative as organization, it is subject to the Law on Cor-
porate Tax and Dividend Tax (see supra part 2.VI.b.), and pays 16% tax on its realized
                                                 
129  Section 21 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 23 (1) and 24 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 
on New Co-operatives. 
130  Section 21 (3) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 25 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
131  Section 22 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 28 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
132  Section 22 (3) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 29 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
133  Section 29 (1) (2) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 40 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
134  Section 29 (3) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 41 (1)of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
135  Section 30 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 42 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New 
Co-operatives. 
136  Section 31 (1) of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives. However, it has concretely defined rights by the 
law: (1) may examine any matter or affair connected with the operation of the organs and the man-
agement of the co-operative; (2) may instruct the board of directors to proceed in accordance with 
the bylaws; (3) may propose the relief or impeachment of the entire board of directors or of some 
of its members and also the convocation of the members’ meeting; (4) may itself convoke the 
members’ meeting if the board of directors fails to fulfil its obligation to this end; (5) on the basis 
of the annual report, expresses its views to the members’ meeting on the management and opera-
tion of the co-operative; without this procedure no valid decision may be passed in regard to the 
annual report; (6) may express its opinions also on other reports and papers submitted to the 
members’ meeting; (7) makes proposals to the members’ meeting on the fees of the officers of the 
co-operative; (8) reports at least once a year on its activity to the members’ meeting. Section 31 (2) 
of Law I of 1992 on Co-operatives; Section 43 (1) of Law CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives. 
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profit.137 According to the provisions of the Law on Personal Income Tax notes repre-
senting share in the co-operative are considered securities and any income related to 
them is taxed accordingly.138 
 
f) Profit-Sharing 
Profit sharing139 is a form of extra-wage (salary) monetary benefit that encourages em-
ployees to increase the profit of the company. It became popular in Hungary at the 
second part of the 1980s (see Bódis, 2005). It became practice at smaller, single owner 
companies. Usually, the managers get a share of the profit at the end of the business 
year, provided the company achieved a certain, in advance determined profit.140 In 
principle, profit-sharing as part of the payment system is internal affair of companies, 
and the State can influence it only through tax and contribution regulations. However, 
as already mentioned above, there are no taxation incentives related to profit-sharing 
and therefore it is not popular. 
 
 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
a) Types of Employee Ownership  
With the introduction of the institutions of market economy beginning in 1988 and 
with the proliferation of privately owned firms the models of financial participation 
‘usual’ in market economies and various forms of share giveaway programs got green 
light too. Under the ‘irregular’ conditions of privatization, however, the various forms 
of participation supported centrally through preferential financial schemes (employee 
shares, ESOP) spread much greater. However, all forms of majority employees owner-
ship decreased after privatization141  
In the analysis of the legal framework it is important to highlight that in the course of 
privatization these forms were used in combination within one company. In Hungary 
three functionally different types of employee ownership were created right at the be-
ginning: the first involved the acquisition of the minority stock packet and small own-
ers are paid dividends. The other two forms ensured participation rights in decision-
making. In the first one group of employees were made owners in one step, who later 
                                                 
137  Section 2 (2) (b) of Law LXXXI of 1996 on Corporate Tax and Dividend Tax. 
138  Section 34 of Law CXVII of 1995 on Personal Income Tax. 
139  In Hungarian ‘nyereségrészesedés.’ 
140  See Hogyan targyaljunk a fizetesrol? [How to negotiate on salary?], P & Bert Consulting, web page 
visited: January 24, 2005 <http://www.pbert.hu/munkav/14.html>. 
141  Janky (1999) concluded  to the similar result. A panel survey made between 1992 and 2000 analyses 
data of about 400 industrial production companies.  
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could become individual owners while in the second type the current employees of the 
enterprise are the owners.  
 
(1) Privatization on Preferential Terms by Employees 
Between 1990 and 1992 employee ownership on preferential terms was created at 540 
companies in compliance with the Asset Policy Guidelines and privatization laws, typi-
cally at a level less than 10% (and nowhere not more than 15%) of employee owner-
ship share142. Unfortunately, there is no available statistics on assets acquired by the 
management and subordinate employees through preferential purchase, still it is quite 
certain that in the later phase of privatization employees in almost all enterprises were 
offered preferential terms of buying.143.  
In the context of above-mentioned circumstances, minority ownership practically dis-
appeared over the time. It could be translated into a durable form of ownership only in 
cases of buy-out companies. Such early share purchases were financed not only by 
preferential term, but also by bank loans and company savings too.  
According to expert estimates, between late 1989 and June 1992, i.e. prior to the pass-
ing of the ESOP bill, employee and management buy-outs took place in about 30 firms 
(Karsai, 1993). Case studies on the early purchases suggest that managers and employ-
ees of low capital small enterprises bought their firms. Furthermore, these firms were 
highly specialised, employing highly qualified labour. At these companies special exper-
tise constituted the main asset, including the network of contacts and relationships in-
dispensable for marketing knowledge. In these cases employees were in a very good 
bargaining position to successfully pursue privatization plans as their special skills and 
knowledge could have been marketed outside the company as well. Firms of early 
management and employee buy-outs operate mostly in the areas of trade, designing, 
consultancy and research. 
 
(2) ESOP 
ESOP is a complex technique, including credit, tax and organizational provisions. It is 
aimed to help employees to buy the whole or a part of the shares of their companies. 
According to State Privatization Company (ÁPV Rt.) records, between 1992 and 1999 
287 ESOP purchases took place in the nominal value of about HUF 51 billion. At the 
time of privatization about 80,000 worked at the 247 enterprises involved in these 
transactions. In addition to transactions by the State Property Agency and Privatization 
Company, state-owned enterprise centres operating as holdings could sell part of their 
assets in ESOP schemes. This latter fact explains why a total of 289 ESOP companies 
                                                 
142  Magyar Hírlap, 13 August 1992.  
143  In course of the privatization as a whole, the 15%-pieces of assets of the various enterprises 
amounted to a significant total value. To give a sense of the order of magnitude, right after privati-
zation there were altogether HUF 13.9 billion worth of employee shares in the 9 privatized elec-
tricity companies (ÁPV Rt. Annual Report 1996). 
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were recorded in late 1995 by Rész-Vétel Foundation, which used tax authority data. 
The heyday of ESOP was 1993 and 1994 with the most transactions taking place that 
time after a slow start; then an amendment of the law in 1995 put an end to the prefer-
ential purchase of majority ownership. 
Over these two or three years, the average share of assets bought by ESOP organisa-
tions gradually decreased: while in 1993 80% of buy-outs were majority buy-outs only 
66% belonged to this category in September 1994 and 48% at the end of 1995. On the 
whole, in 47% of cases recorded by Rész-Vétel Foundation ESOP was a full or major-
ity owner, and in 24% an owner with controlling rights (25 to 50%).144 
At the beginning, ESOP was a privatization technique typically used in medium and 
small sized companies. Nearly two thirds (65%) of the businesses involved were me-
dium-sized companies employing 100 to 1000 and hardly more than half of the com-
panies had as much own capital as HUF 100 to 500 million and as few as 5% of them 
had an over HUF 1 billion worth of capital. The greater capital a company had, it 
seems, the smaller was the share of ownership bought out by the employees145. 
Almost half of ESOP companies were manufacturers, one quarter were in trade and 
16% in services. It is in the trading industry where the share of ESOP companies is the 
greatest (6%), and their share is relatively large in manufacturing and in constructions. 
At the same time, however, in agriculture, tourism and real estate the share of em-
ployee-owned companies is far below the average. 
In summary it can be said that in 1998, the year of closing privatization, as little as one 
per cent of assets of companies other than financial institutions was in management or 
employee ownership in Hungary. Furthermore, ESOP company employees make up as 
little as 1,2% of employment by legal entity economic organisations (limited liability 
companies, joint-stock companies) (Laky et al., 1999). Of course, considering only pri-
vatized assets, the share of management and employee ownership was higher, espe-
cially at around late 1993 when it amounted to 12%146.  
After privatization was over, between 1993 and 1995, the ownership structure did not 
much change at the majority of ESOP companies bought from loans as debtors could 
not sell their shares before full repayment of the loan. As of 1996 and 1997, however, 
both inside ownership and the ownership share of subordinate employees considerably 
shrank. According to HCSO data, in the first quarter of 2005 there were 151 ESOP 
organisations. (While records are not fully up to date because of delays in reporting, the 
rate of decrease is apparent: after mass privatization was over there were about 300 
ESOP organisations in 1998 and 252 in the first quarter of 2001147.) 
                                                 
144  Rész-Vétel Foundation, Summary of ownership purchase by ESOP organizations 1995. 
145  Ibid. 
146  In Mihályi’s (1988) calculations, in 1993 assets sold by ESOP technique as per the contract price 
made up 16% of the total annual privatization revenue, and 32.0% of domestic sales. 
147  Preliminary information. The number of business organisations. HCSO (2001). 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
31 
Between 1995 and 1999 the share of large ESOP companies employing over 1000 
dropped to half. In 1999 the majority of ESOP companies (55%) were in manufactur-
ing but their share in trade and services shrank to 20% and 10%, respectively (Boda 
and Neumann, 1999).148 
The share of companies in majority ESOP ownership decreased from the initial 58 % 
to 38 % by September 2000, and that of companies with 25 to 50 % ownership share 
ensuring the right of control decreased from 29 to 2 % in the respective period (Boda 
and Neumann, 2002).149 
As a result of legal regulations, the overwhelming majority of ESOP organizations 
ceased to exist after the loans were repaid. Should the ESOP organisation remain, em-
ployees themselves are required to develop the regulation (such as rules of marketing 
shares) for the period after repayment. Furthermore, the established forms of operat-
ing the asset (such as setting up a limited company) involve considerable costs. So far 
only one or two companies are known to have developed the mechanisms and rules at 
significant expenses (both human and financial) to ensure that the ownership share is 
retained by the current employees. 
By September 2000 around one third of companies repaid their loans. In over half of 
them employees remained the owners of their company, but when the ESOP organiza-
tion ceased to exist, employee ownership was converted into individual small owner-
ship and employees disposed of their shares freely and individually. Thus, these com-
panies are not different from those in which employees are individual owners150. Loan 
repayment accelerated the shrinking of employee ownership: there are external owners 
in about half of unencumbered companies, which is the sign of post-privatization 
sale.151 
 
(3) Employees’ Shares 
The history of employee shares in Hungary began with the distribution of property 
notes: state enterprises could give their employees property notes as a piece of enter-
prise profits. After the commercialisation of the enterprise these notes were converted 
                                                 
148  Balance sheet figures of ESOP companies between 1993 and 1996 were compiled by János Ho-
vorka at Rész-Vétel Foundation using data of the of Gazdaságkutató RT (Economic Research 
Company). Furthermore, data of the Short Term Labour Market Forecast survey by OMMK were 
used to compare the financial perspectives of 121 ESOP companies and 3,512 companies in other 
forms of ownership, weighed by size and industry.  
149  In a telephone survey in September 2000 67 ESOP companies were selected to be asked about 
loan amortisation, the position of the ESOP organisation, inside and external ownership and the 
finances of the company. 4% of the companies could not be found and 4% refused to answer 
(Boda and Neumann, 2002). 
150  The two kinds of employee ownerships became even more similar with the amendment of the 
ESOP law in 2003, which allowed retiring employees to keep part of their ownership.  
151  Research findings suggest that the occurrence of post-privatization sale is not greater in ESOP 
buyers than in other domestic buyers (Árva and Diczházi, 1998). 
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in employee shares and thus could be used in the buy-out. Up to 1991 the commer-
cialisation of almost all profitable enterprises were preceded by giving out property 
notes.  
Issuing (and quoting) employee shares is a concomitant of privatization. Originally the 
relevant law allowed existing enterprises with a positive balance sheet from the last year 
to issue free or preferential employee shares in the value of up to 10% of their raised 
registered capital. Many state enterprises, however, cooked their books and created a 
special fund called ‘assets in addition to registered capital’ financing employees’ share 
purchase. While the State Property Agency basically did not support the issuance of 
shares free of charge against the company’s own resources, this was an option in case 
of external buyers because 20% of the sales price was reimbursed to the company to 
cover employee shares.  
According to a study by Teréz Laky in 1992, up to mid-1991 the State Property Agency 
issued permission for 20 companies to issue free shares. Preferential shares ranged 
from 1.15% to 16.3% of the company’s registered capital (preferential shares were sold 
free or for 10 or 50 or 60 % of their nominal value.) Most commonly, employees could 
buy at 50%, payable by instalments. Company regulation on the purchase of preferen-
tial employee shares usually favoured managers as the limit was specified as a percent-
age of base wages. The author argues that minority packets in the form of employee 
shares do not ensure meaningful participation in the company’s decision-making 
mechanism152. 
There are no statistics on the sales of employee shares and only case studies provide 
information on what happened to them. While employee shares might amount to 10% 
of the total value of privatized enterprises these forms of ownership were far from be-
ing stable as owners sold the soonest possible. The intention of employees to sell 
quickly was especially obvious in companies of which the share became quoted, or 
were expected to be, at the exchange market, and their value rapidly grew to several 
times as high as when on initial public offering (for instance: EGIS, MATÁV, MOL 
etc.) Actually, there were cases, when trade unions supported the management to resale 
preferential employee shares so actively that they looked for brokerage firms them-
selves 153. 
                                                 
152  Data of the State Property Agency analysed by Teréz Laky (1992). 
153  For instance, in the electricity industry the trade union concluded a deal with the privatization min-
ister prior to privatization on a special scheme of employees’ ownership with bettered preferential 
conditions. Once foreign owners appeared in the industry the companies bought employee shares, 
mostly at the price the State Property Agency sold shares. As investors were granted practically 
unlimited management rights even with minority capital share, buying employee shares by the 
companies was considered an act of generosity.  
 Keeping their shares and influencing decision-making was never a consideration for employees. 
Employee shares in the course of the privatization of EGIS is a typical illustration: the trade union 
and the enterprise made a deal beforehand that the company will buy the shares from the employ-
ees and thereby would spare the costs of issuance and using a broker firm (Magyar Hírlap, 2 May 
1998). 
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(4) Stock Long-Term Incentive Plans 
In case of public issuance of shares, employees had some pre-emptive or reduced price 
purchase possibilities right from the beginning of the privatization period. In the early 
period of ‘spontaneous privatization’, at companies about to be transformed into a 
non-public joint-stock company and promising outstandingly great profits, managers 
were in the position to know important information before other buyers.154 (Selling on 
the stock exchange market became significant in the last years of privatization: its share 
was 71% in 1997, 80% in 1998 and 98% in 1999 (László, 2004).  
Our review of current company practices on long term incentives are based on data 
from two of the biggest consulting firms in Hungary.155 
According to information of Hewitt Inside Ltd, in 2004 26% of enterprises used a sort 
of long term incentive system. Most of them (80%) launched Stock Option Plans, and 
many (30%) used performance shares.  
In the practice of HayGroup Ltd , 37% of clients gave their employees shares in 
2004.The majority (66.5%) of enterprises using employee share benefits offers employ-
ees Stock Option Plans; fairly wide spread is the share purchase program (33.4%). 
Stock Option Plans most often (62%) involve buying equity shares at the stock ex-
change, and 30% provide shares through issuing equity shares after commercialisation. 
Stock Option Plans last minimally for 1 to 3 years and maximum for 5 to 6 years, and 
the option ensures on average a 30% supplement to the employee’s basic wage. The 
actual levels are determined on the basis of job and position, and in 67% of cases 
companies used some kind of performance criteria. 
90% of Hungarian companies giving employees shares have adopted the remuneration 
policy of their foreign mother company considering the practice of long term incen-
tives and have taken over the various forms of share benefits in their incentive policy. 
In these forms of financial participation, however, mostly managers were favoured as 
the fundamental aim of long term incentives is to make top managers identify them-
                                                 
154  A sort of legislative support for this technique is that the personal income tax of that time ensured 
much more favourable relief on investments than the current one. This relief, of course, were 
available for other forms of management and employee ownership too. 
155  The incentive system of 50 companies was surveyed by the Hewitt Associates in 2003, the majority 
of which were large ones in terms of sales and number of employees. The majority (66%) were 
foreign-owned, 20% were producing, 27% were service providers and 27% were trading compa-
nies. In their system, the contingent wage includes short and long term incentives and social and 
other benefits (Hewitt Inside Consulting: Total Compensation Measurement (TCM), Hungary 
2004).  
 A similar study by HayGroup analyses wage data  of 201 mostly foreign-owned companies (82%). 
84% of all companies give their employees some kind of contingent wage made up of bo-
nuses/premia, profit share, and turnover bonus in sales jobs (Hay income level study 2004, Hay 
Group 2005, Hay Executive Compensation Report, Hay Group 2005). 
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selves with the long term goals of the company, retain the key top managers at the 
given firm and supplement employees’ income – said the interviewees156. 
 
(5) Approved Employee Securities Benefit Program 
Security benefits programs enjoying tax relief are available as of 1st January 2003, but 
are too new to have any meaningful information on how they work at companies.  
The new section 77 of the Act on Personal Income Tax set up the legal frames of two 
different schemes. Sections 77/A and 77/B is applicable for top managers of foreign- 
owned companies when they are given shares of the mother company. These are not 
employee shares in the strict sense of the word as the managers are employed by the 
Hungarian subsidiary and not by the mother company. The law favours this ‘triangle’ 
situation: while a personal income tax is payable because the shares are regarded as la-
bour income, no social security contribution must be paid (earlier share benefits were 
regarded as in-kind benefits, belonging to the highest, 44%, income tax bracket, and 
also social security contribution was payable. The current regulation is more favour-
able, and no authority permission is required either.) In practice, however, just to be 
safe, companies using this kind of scheme apply for a ‘Contingent tax levy order’ at the 
Ministry of Finance in advance because the amount of money involved is quite big and 
in case a tax authority investigation finds non-compliance fines can be very high. This 
piece of law thus regulates the benefits for top managers of Hungarian subsidiaries of 
multinational companies, and at least partially ‘whitens’ of earlier tax evading practices. 
More important for this paper is the use of Section 77/C regulating the broad based 
employee share benefits worth a relatively small amount. Because of the statutory 
threshold levels (at least 10% of the employees must participate; the management’s 
share must be less than 25%; annually HUF 500 thousand worth of shares are tax fee; 
and respite period of three taxation years is granted before cashing), it is worth apply-
ing the scheme only in case of broad-based benefit programs. Furthermore, the per-
mission procedure is very complicated, a broker company must be used and transac-
tion costs are high. In the two years since the legislation as few as 7 or 8 companies 
have applied and have been granted permission, and the number of participating em-
ployees is not more than a few thousand. The companies typically are relatively large 
multinational enterprises in Hungary that adapt the share benefit programs designed by 
the headquarters for all of the subsidiaries. Similarly to the procedure made possible by 
Section 77/A and B, both adaptation of benefit schemes and application for permis-
sion is carried out by consultant or law firms hired by the enterprises. Usually they are 
permanent clients and the firms are familiar with both the practices of the multina-
tional company abroad and the operation circumstances, incentive and wage systems in 
Hungary. The permission procedure itself is ‘client friendly’ in the sense that the appli-
                                                 
156  There are no available data on employees participating in company programs. The low penetration 
of participation, however, is seen in the HCSO labour force survey data. Less than 1%, only 281 of 
30,000 respondent employees received employee shares. Unpublished data (HCSO, 2004). 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
35 
cation is submitted only after it has been previously reviewed by the authority and cor-
rections have been made, thus so far none of the applications have been refused. The 
Ministry of Finance, however, checks only formal requirements and has no informa-
tion on the underlying economic and incentive logic. What is clear, however, from the 
applications submitted by companies is that the typical scheme is free share programs. 
An exception is the pioneering ‘two for the price of one’ practice of Henkel. According 
to the staff of the Ministry of Finance, the amount of the benefit depends on position 
in the hierarchy rather than on performance indicators. 
In the ministry’s evaluation, the main motivation for using the scheme is low taxes, 
which is available also with other in-kind benefits (for instance support of voluntary 
insurance payment, tax free up to the amount of the minimum wage – currently HUF 
57,000 per month – and can be immediately used for health care services). 
 
(6) Co-operatives 
After the change of the regime the legal regulation of co-operatives changed too, 
breaking with the traditional co-operative spirit. Surviving and restructured co-
operatives, however, play an insignificant role in economy and in employment as well. 
According to HCSO data, 31st December 2004 out of the 416 thousand active incorpo-
rated enterprises there were 5,219 co-operatives in operation in the country but 2,607 
of them employed none and operated purely as an organisation of owners. (A typical 
solution in consumer co-operatives is that the real economic activities were transferred 
into a business organisation and thus control by membership became only a formality.) 
36% of existing co-operatives work in services, 30% in agriculture and 19% in trade.157 
Employment by the co-operative sector currently is insignificant: according to data by 
the HCSO Labour Force Survey, in 2004 only 0.2% of the employed were income 
earning co-operative members.158 
 
b) Profit-Sharing 
In the traditional Hungarian state socialism system, profit-sharing was a flexible ele-
ment of income compared to the base wage and most domestically owned companies 
still use this practice. Multinational- or foreign-owned companies, however, pursue 
their own methods developed inside the mammoth company. Some foreign- compa-
nies in Hungary apply the American incentive model which is highly profit-oriented 
and focuses on incentives for the management (thereby creates huge differences within 
the company) while others use the European model of incentives which creates smaller 
differences and serves longer term interests.  
According to Hewitt Associates, about 80% of the enterprises in Hungary use short 
term incentive tools that go beyond the simple sales premium. 20% of them use profit-
                                                 
157  A gazdasági szervezetek száma [Number active undertakings] (2004), Budapest:  HCSO.  
158  Főbb munkaügyi folyamatok [Labour report)] January–December 2004 (2005), Budapest: HCSO. 
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sharing. In most cases (at 67% of companies) the basis of entitlement is one’s position 
in the hierarchy, but many places (23% of the enterprises) set other criteria as well. Ac-
cording to the survey, however, only 10% of entitled employees receive a share of the 
profits. A more frequent form of short term incentives is performance bonus, which is 
more democratic in the sense that it is payable to all employees at half of the compa-
nies. Also, a variety of bonuses paid on the basis of some kind of indicator other than 
profits are more frequent than profit-sharing.  
 
 
4. Empirical Evidence of Economic and Social Effects 
 
There is little empirical experience with the use of centrally not supported forms of 
participation because companies consider it their own affair. The use of the new ‘Ap-
proved Employee Securities Benefit Program’ is only about to penetrate. Thus, infor-
mation is mostly available on the working of ESOP companies.  
 
a) Empirical Evidence of Social Effects 
 
(1) The Relative Weight of Employee Ownership within the Company (Ownership Share Concentration) 
On average, in early time (between 1989 and 1992) buy-out transactions 85% of the 
employees became owners of their companies (Karsai, 1993).159 The number of ESOP 
company employees was nearly 80,000 and on average 70% of employees were owners 
(Kubik and Matolay, 1998). 160 
The most interesting aspect of the division of assets between ‘inside’ buyers is the pro-
portion of ownership of the management and of employees. The early buy-outs 
through limited companies created majority management ownership: in two thirds of 
companies the share of management ownership was 50% + 1 share and in one third 30 
to 40 % (Karsai, 1993). The high share of management (CEO and managers together) 
ownership is underlined by data given by Kovách and Csite (1999) too: in almost half 
(48.9%) of the companies dominated by employee and management ownership, the 
share of management ownership is 50 to 99 %. 161  
                                                 
159  Surprisingly enough, the high participation rate of employees (50 to 70 %) is independent of the 
fact that the cash collateral for the loan came from individual payments or company assets. 
160  Participation was limited only by rules that were set by the employees themselves (for instance 
minimum service period). Where no individual payment was needed because costs of buying were 
taken over by the company, almost all employees became owners, as in the majority of ESOP 
cases.  
161  In a research in 1997, the chief executive officers of 566 large companies (with revenues over HUF 
200 million) were asked about their careers and the business results of the company. The analysis 
compared the performance of companies of various ownership forms. (By their definition in ‘em-
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Generally, the management could easily obtain the desired share of ownership within 
ESOP organizations, too. 162 The rates of individual payments in buy-outs were based 
on wages and position held in the organisation almost everywhere even if payments 
eventually were made from company resources. Furthermore, the majority of by-laws 
provide that loan repayment is annually converted into individual small shares in pro-
portion with the original individual payment, fully and automatically. 163  Few ESOP 
by-laws provide that shares should be converted into small ownership on an on-going 
basis in the course of the maturity period based on the performances and merits in the 
given year. Yet, this could be the way to ensure that the company remain in the hands 
of current employees at least during the repayment period. 
In this way, what was said to be ‘almost all are owners’, in reality became entrenched 
gaps within the company right at the outset. The finding of our 1993 research was that 
the greatest and smallest ratios of income and ownership in a typical light industry 
company were 1:20 and 1:100, respectively (Boda and Neumann, 1999). In addition to 
CEO dominance, it was observed that of subordinate employees only the workers’ 
elite, i.e. highly qualified skilled workers with long service period at the company, par-
ticipated in the buy-out.164 
After loans are repaid, subordinate employees becoming ‘free’ owners mostly sell their 
shares to managers. The concentration of shares sooner or later leads to majority man-
agement ownership even at companies in which this was not the original case. At com-
panies where the number of members of the body of owners has dropped to fewer 
than 10, obviously the management, or to put it more accurately top managers are the 
dominant entrepreneur-owners. The earlier mentioned telephone survey suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                    
ployee- and management-owned companies’ at least 50% of the shares of the company – or the 
biggest packet of stocks – were in the hands of employees, managers and the CEO. Another cate-
gory, the ‘entrepreneurial ownership’ comprises enterprises in which the dominant owner is the 
CEO. ) 
162  The 1992 ESOP law delegates it unrestrictedly to the competence of the by-law or assembly to 
regulate the distribution of repaid shares between the participants. The provisions in the 2003 
amendment, which limit ownership differences came far too late and could prevent extreme dif-
ferences only in ESOPs set up later.  
163  The management could succeed in the most company without any open conflict. Some of the case 
studies, however, told about tougher intervention. Some of the case studies, however, told about 
tougher intervention. In smaller ESOP companies and in ‘buy-out limited companies’, where own-
ership depends on the actual individual payments, managers controlled the process of quotation as 
well. When there was an over-demand for the originally planned ESOP asset, buyers were ‘dis-
suaded’, or executives could decide what share they wanted to buy to ensure majority control by 
knowing others’ quotes.  
164  At four enterprises covered by an early privatization research, 63.4% of 202 owner-employees had 
worked at the company for more than ten years and 91% had at least a vocational training 
(Rozgonyi and Jávor, 1996). 
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this became the situation in all companies where the total number of employees 
dropped to under 20 or 30.165 
According to the ESOP law, the by-law regulates eligibility criteria for joining the 
ESOP organization at a later time. At most of the companies, financial support for 
down payments was a one-time act limited to privatization and late-comers are re-
quired to pay.  There is hardly any by-law that provides that shares remaining in the 
organisation’s ownership should be used as a fund to finance newcomers’ preferential 
or free of charge purchase. These rules tend to lead in the most cases to the creation of 
‘exclusive’ ESOP organizations.  
 
(2) ESOP Interest Representation 
The ESOP law grants full autonomy for ESOP organisations to create their own rules. 
In practice, however, the by-laws of ESOP organizations mostly apply the model of 
businesses rather than of co-operatives, consequently decision-making is based on vot-
ing according to individual payments and the ratio of shares, and only rarely on a ‘one 
member - one vote’ basis. It is a typical mistake of ESOP rules that they do not ad-
dress the problem of creating transparent and democratic procedures to specify the 
guidelines of representation for ESOP trusts.  
ESOPs have failed to find an institutional way to cope with the basic contradiction of 
owners’ representation, i.e. employees are subordinated to the CEO but at the same 
time, as owners, are the employers of the CEO. The business organisation and the 
owners’ organisation are almost never separated. At most places the chief executive 
officer or his/her deputy or other confidant is an important member in the ESOP or-
ganisation, too.  
Our case studies suggest that top managers are rarely seriously controlled by owners 
(Boda and Neumann, 1999). There have been scarcely any cases when the owners’ or-
ganisation fired a bad management. At most companies owners were unable to prevent 
the management’s from pursuing plans of restructuring and redundancy even if they 
wanted to.166 
According to Rozgonyi and Jávor (1996), even if strategic issues are put on the assem-
bly agenda, employees seem to be much less interested than in issues directly affecting 
                                                 
165  The research found enterprises at which the number of owner employees decreased much more 
than the number of all employees. Up to 2003 dividing the company up into business organisa-
tions was a legal tool to push employee owners out. Employees ‘out sourced’ from the main com-
pany could not keep their ownership shares as only those could participate in ESOP who were in 
the employment of the enterprise. 
166  Authoritarian CEOs, now in the position of owners, are of course inclined to pursue old practices. 
Thus, owners’ fora are very much like the old workers’ assembly, where opinions were heard and 
discussed without exercising any real influence. Often participants are not clear about their rights 
or prefer not to confront the management such as voting against management proposals. 
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them (e.g. work conditions) or in decisions on redundancy, work organisation or work 
order that have negative consequences. 
Still, however incidental and weak this form of participation is, it has often lead to a 
different quality of boss-subordinate relationships. The management is required at least 
as much as to periodically account of their activities and convince the employee co-
owners of the reasonability of managerial actions. ‘Insider’ ownership, however, makes 
it easy to maintain earlier power relations based on informal deals. In case of this form 
of ownership, the workers’ elite can reasonably hope that they will be able to retain 
their privileges and have a greater chance to keep their jobs and positions in wage bar-
gaining than other employees. 
It can reasonably be concluded that the weakness of the owners’ organisation has con-
tributed to the current insignificance of this form of ownership. While in operation, 
ESOPs had failed to prove their usefulness and thus members could hardly wait to 
dispose of their shares. Even if employees keep their shares, coordinating the interests 
of the many small owners without the organisational and institutional frames is more 
difficult than before. 
 
b) Empirical Evidence of Economic Effects 
The analysis of the balance sheet figures suggests that the performance of ESOP com-
panies between 1993 and 1997 was not worse than the average of double-entry book 
keeping companies (Boda and Neumann, 1999). ESOP companies in trade as well as in 
industrial and retail servicing were especially competitive. According to 2000 data, the 
share of profit making ESOP companies dropped to 70% (from 80% in 1997, based 
on balance sheet figures), 10% of them operated at a loss and about 20% were just 
about at a break-even level (Boda and Neumann, 2002). Nevertheless, cessation of 
ESOPs is only rarely related to business performance.167 
Kovách and Csite (1999) found that enterprises in employees’ ownership (owned by 
entrepreneurs and by employees and management) were more efficient than other 
ownership forms in terms of per assets sales revenues in 1996 and realised considerable 
revenues even with little company assets. At the same time, in terms of labour effi-
ciency these companies were less successful than others: despite large lay-offs, per em-
ployee revenues were smaller than the average.  
                                                 
167  There are few examples that by reselling, employee-owners tried to save their companies which in 
a dire capital situation had operated with a loss for 3 or 4 years. (Such cases were found mostly in 
the successor companies of AGROKER, a trading company of agricultural machines and tools). 
In other cases, mostly in food trading and construction firms, it was found that the buy-out by 
several domestic companies jointly was to block foreign competition. In the majority of the cases, 
however, the external buyers were foreign trade investors, competitors already settled in the coun-
try. Firms with a great domestic market share or valuable real estates were especially on demand. 
In most of them, the buy-out took place before loan repayment was over. These cases, for instance 
the Nagykanizsa brewery, Centrum stores and more recently MMG Automatics, were extensively 
covered in the media. 
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Janky has similar statements: chances for meaningful participatory forms are greater if 
the relative capital need of the company (per capital assets) and the number of employ-
ees are low. 100% employee ownership is created in enterprises where the activities are 
highly complex (high rate of non-series products); also, there is a significant correlation 
between skill-intensive production and high share of employee ownership (Janky, 
2002). 
In summary, those employee-owned companies operate the most successfully which 
were privatized early (in 1992 and 1993). Furthermore, those with minority employee 
owners do better than ones in majority employee ownership. Based on an analysis of 
changes in revenues, efficiency and liabilities since 1990, the financial management of 
the majority of small and medium sized MBO and ESOP companies seem to be solid 
and efficient. Large enterprises were the worst performing ones. Failures were due to 
great debts, incurred independently of privatization, and probably to bad market posi-
tions and bad management. 
Employee-owned enterprises can be competitive in those segments of the market that 
meet special demand. The overwhelming majority of well-working ESOP companies 
produce for a stable domestic (or regional) market. In some of them this is a natural 
consequence of the type of activities they do (for instance, service providers for 
households). In the sectors where foreign competitors are present, ESOP companies 
have a chance to stay in the market by offering low prices or meeting special demand 
(for instance extraordinary consumer taste). Furthermore, they are at an advantage in 
labour intensive activities. 
 
(1) Employment 
As for human resources management, no ESOP company was found to have gone 
bankrupt because of employment or wage decisions made in favour of the employees. 
In fact, redundancy was more frequent in ESOP companies than in other enterprises. 
For instance, in 1999 in the first six months the number of employees decreased or 
remained at the previous level in over two thirds (78%) of ESOP companies while in 
only 60% of other kinds of enterprises (Boda and Neumann, 2002). Similar are the 
trends in companies of other forms of employee ownership: redundancies were the 
greatest in employee-management-owned companies between 1993 and 1996 (Kovách 
and Csite, 2002). 
ESOP companies do not raise concerns in terms of wage outflow either. The projected 
growth index of average earnings in 1999/1998 was almost identical in the two catego-
ries of companies (Boda and Neumann, 2002).168 Case studies suggest that in-kind 
benefits and cash received in connection with ownership make up an increasingly large 
part of remuneration of employees (Boda, 1996). 
                                                 
168  The wage growth index was lower than 10% in 47% of ESOP companies, 11-15% in 38% of 
them, and higher than that in 15%. In 46% of the other group of companies wages did not change 




(2) Asset Management 
Data suggest that the financial situation of surveyed ESOP companies worsened. 
While between 1993 and 1997 their debt (liabilities/own capital) and liquidity (current 
assets/short term liabilities) indicators were better than the average of double-entry 
book keeping companies, in 1998 and 1999 figures of overdue receivables were worse. 
In September 2000 one third of companies finished loan repayment and only one 
company was still in a grace period. Apart from losing companies, these companies 
amortized the loans on time; moreover paying the instalments seemed to be more im-
portant for them than making social security payments or paying taxes. At the same 
time, some reservations about employee ownership proved to be right: ESOP compa-
nies invested less in machines and real estate development than others: in the second 
six months of 1999 22% of employee-owned companies made some kind of invest-
ment as opposed to 38% of other enterprises (Boda and Neumann, 2002). 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In Hungary employee ownership has been the most frequent form of employee finan-
cial participation. Although legislation is in place for both profit-sharing and employee 
share ownership, Employee Share Ownership Programme is still the prevailing form in 
Hungary.  
The different schemes mentioned in the PEPPER reports emerged in the context of 
privatization as well as in the context of companies’ incentive plans, though the latter 
to a very limited extent. Profit sharing is not widespread, while specific incentives do 
not exist, neither for employees nor for employers. Employee shares, including stock 
options, are regulated by the law, and recently the ‘Approved Employee Securities 
Benefit Program’ has been introduced, including specific incentives. Companies issuing 
Employee Shares can offer buyers up to 90% discount, but this special shares’ value is 
largely reduced by their limited transferability. At the same time traditional forms like 
co-operatives however, play an insignificant role in economy and in employment as 
well. 
The employee share ownership programs (ESOPs) emerging in the context of the pri-
vatization became very popular and it was regulated in detail, providing various incen-
tives. (There were three other than ESOP financial techniques for acquiring employee 
ownership at preferential terms in the context of privatization: price reduction, pur-
chase on instalment payment and purchase on credit.) Employee-ownership was 
mostly a societal, justice and equity policy priority thus it could only become a realistic 
option when privatization demand shrank and/or the popularity of privatization 
seemed intolerably low. 
42 
The privatization rule that – as a result of company power relations – no enterprise 
could be sold against the will of the local management was maintained throughout the 
whole privatization period. So the Hungarian ESOP spread quickly in the early phase 
of privatization. Despite this fact in the end the relative weight of this ownership form 
in the whole of the economy is not significant. With privatization over, the number of 
ESOP companies has been decreasing relatively fast. Set-back of this ownership form 
has been connected to the unfavourable regulation at least to the same extent as the 
economic performance of companies.  
Since the end of privatization in 1998 lobbyists have been fighting without any success 
for political support and financial encouragement for ESOP ‘outside privatization’ as 
well as to make the technique applicable in case of liquidation. Furthermore, emphasis-
ing the international trend of individual account based pension system; plans to en-
courage tying employee ownership to pension fund membership have gone so far un-
noticed. On the whole, in Hungary there is no policy on employee ownership. While 
most of the political parties (both on the left and the right) declare their commitment 
to the issue, concrete economic policy decisions are still missing. It seems that what 
has been achieved in terms of employee participation needed the élan of privatization 
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